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Evolutionary Stable Strategy
Application of Nash Equilibrium in Biology
Jayanti Ray-Mukherjee and Shomen Mukherjee
Every behaviourally responsive animal (including us) make
decisions. These can be simple behavioural decisions such as
where to feed, what to feed, how long to feed, decisions related
to finding, choosing and competing for mates, or simply
maintaining ones territory. All these are conflict situations
between competing individuals, hence can be best understood
using a game theory approach. Using some examples of clas-
sical games, we show how evolutionary game theory can help
understand behavioural decisions of animals. Game theory
(along with its cousin, optimality theory) continues to provide
a strong conceptual and theoretical framework to ecologists
for understanding the mechanisms by which species coexist.
Most of you, at some point, might have seen two cats fighting. It
is often accompanied with the cats facing each other with puffed
up fur, arched back, ears back, tail twitching, with snarls, growls,
and howls aimed at each other. But, if you notice closely, they
often try to avoid physical contact, and spend most of their time
in the above-mentioned behavioural displays. Biologists refer to
this as a ‘limited war’ or conventional (ritualistic) strategy (not
causing serious injury), as opposed to dangerous (escalated)
strategy (Figure 1) [1]. Such behaviours, i.e., avoidance of physi-
cal contact in order to minimize chances of injury when fighting
for mate or territory, are also seen in other animal groups such as
dogs, wolves, as well as humans.
Now allow us to explain a few things about cat behaviour, which
will help better understand the limited war strategy. All cats
(there are 38 species in theworld) are territorial animals, and they
actively maintain their territories using scent-marking. They
mark either using their facial glands, or urine. If you have had a
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domestic cat rub its face against your leg, it most likely marked
you with excretions from its facial glands. These marking
behaviours act as signal to the other cats in that area about its
presence (identity). This makes other individuals think twice
before intruding, thereby reducing the chances of a conflict. If the
intruder decides to ignore these signs, then sooner or later this
will lead to a combat. Similar territorial behaviour is seen not
only in other predators such as wild dogs, wolves, and mongoose,
but also among non-predators such as rhinos and antelopes which
form a dung pile or specific spots within their territory where they
regularly defecate.
Figure 1. (a) Limited war or
conventional strategy and (b)
total-war or dangerous strat-
egy.
Sketch by: Ayan Guha
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The interaction between the resident cat and the intruding cat can
be considered a game. Say ABOL and TABOL are the two male
cats (i.e., the players) ready for combat. They being vicious
fighters, are capable of inflicting serious injuries to each other.
When they meet to fight, both possess a set of strategies (tactic):
the less dangerous (no physical contact, but use behaviours
mentioned above) or conventional strategy ‘C’, and a dangerous
‘D’ strategy (having physical contact) which can likely lead to
serious injuries to its opponent, and also itself. So, cats that are
only growling and snarling at each other are using ‘C’ strategy,
and when they inflict wounds on one another (paw fighting) they
are using a ‘D’ strategy. The interaction between the two cats is a
game because the strategy used by ABOL depends on TABOL’s
strategy and vice versa. In most cat-duels the, ‘C’ strategy is more
common [1].
This interaction between ABOL and TABOL can be explained by
a classical game– theprisoner’s dilemma (Box 1), whichwas first
described in the context of two arrested prisoners, being sepa-
rately interrogated, who have to independently decide whether to
confess or deny a crime.
Let us look at the cat interaction using the prisoner’s dilemma
game. As we mentioned earlier, each individual has two strate-
gies (conventional and dangerous). The outcome of their
Box 1. Prisoner’s Dilemma
Imagine a situation where two individuals have been arrested for a crime they have cooperated to perform.
Now they are being questioned separately so that one implicates the other. If neither accuses the other, both
are set free – the cooperative strategy.
The police decide to tempt them a bit, so that one or both defect. They give each prisoner the following
offer. If one defects against the other, then she is going to be set free (and will also receive a small reward)
and the other prisoner is punished. But, if one of the prisoners implicates the other, and not vice versa,
then the implicated partner gets a harsher sentence. If both confess, both are punished.Each prisoner’s
dilemma is that, if they both think rationally then the best thing to do is to implicate the other, although
they would both be better off trusting each other
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interations, can be laid out in a matrix form, i.e., the payoff matrix
(Figure 2). The best strategy for both ABOL and TABOL is to use
strategy ‘C’, i.e., avoid a fight and hence injury, which is an
equilibrium payoff, i.e., a Nash equilibrium (both ABOL and
TABOL achieve a maximum payoff). In evolutionary terms, it is
called an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS), [1, 2]. In evolution-
ary game theory, a system is not driven by its players, by the
differential success of strategies in a population (described later).
In reality, animal combats are vastly complicated, and this simple
game is likely to be played over and over again. In this repeated
game, also known as the iterated prisoner’s dilemma [3], ABOL
and TABOL play the prisoners dilemma game multiple times, and
each remembers the previous actions of its opponent and changes
its strategy accordingly. Let us try to represent their interactions:
ABOL: C C C C C C C C C D C C C C C C C D
TABOL: C C C C C C C C C D C C C C C C C R
ABOL starts by cooperating (‘C’), TABOL retaliates with ‘C’.
ABOL continues with ‘C’ for the first nine moves, but on the 10th
move, it decides to play ‘D’, even though TABOL played ‘C’ in the
earlier move. This ‘provocation’ escalates their interaction, and
TABOL retaliates by playing ‘D’. In the above example, when
ABOL provokes in the 18th move, TABOL retreats (‘R’), and
ABOL is the winner! If it was a good territory (lot of food/mate)
that they were fighting over, ABOL would have a greater fitness
benefit (more number of offspring left behind). All is not bad news
Inevolutionary
game theory, a
system is not driven
by its players, rather
by the differential
success of
strategies in a
population.
Figure 2. A payoff matrix
betweenABOLandTABOL,
which shows that when they
alwlays cooperate and plays
the conventional ‘C’ tactic it
isbest for everyone(for them
and their species) as op-
posed to ‘D’, the dangerous
tactic or section fight.
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for TABOL. Its decision to retreat not only reduced its chances of
getting injured, but it also helped save both energy and time, vital
resources which could be used in another location (e.g., challeng-
ing another individual, or seeking out new feeding grounds) or
could be spent on foraging.
Do Bad Guys Always Win: Not True
Animals have been playing games even before humans came
along. These games have given rise to multiple coexisting strate-
gies. But all animals have individual variation within a popula-
tion, which in other words is their personality. Although their
strategies can range across a continuum of personalities, game
theorists have outlined a game with two main strategies: the
HAWKs (bad aggressive individuals) and the DOVEs (the good
individuals). Hawks always fight to kill or injure their opponents,
whereas the doves display but never engage in serious fights.
Shouldn’t the doves become extinct in the population?
No. Clearly an all-dove population is not stable since it can be
easily invaded by a hawk. However, an all-hawk population is
also not possible since these individuals will injure/kill each
other (i.e., high cost) and not be able to produce offspring and
propagate their genes. Hence, in such a population, being a dove
can be useful and dove genes will spread in this population. In
any conflict situation, although dove will always end up losing
the resource to a hawk, but it never gets hurt (hence it never
decreases in fitness) when confronting a hawk. Therefore the
interactions are always neutral with respect to the dove’s fitness.
Personality research in invertebrates and vertebrates shows that
although in the short term, aggressive individuals have an advan-
tage (greater access to food and mates), they make bad parents
and mates and hence have lower fitness overall [4]. Thus natural
selection favours a mixed population of hawks and doves [2],
where they have similar average payoffs and the two strategies
are at equilibrium, hence are in an evolutionary stable state.
Can there be a middle path between the dove and hawk strategy?
Can there be a
middle path,
between the dove
and the hawk
strategy?
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What if individuals could assess the different
roles within a strategy, and had the choice of
playing each role when they thought it was ap-
propriate?Thismeans that although the frequency
of hawk and dove strategy remains the same, the
individual chooses when to play which strategy.
Since now individuals have a choice of using a
given strategy based on their assessment, it is
now a hawk-dove ESS, compared to a hawk-
dove evolutionary stable state. Such a strategy is
called Bourgeois or the Retaliator. Such indi-
viduals always play hawk if they are an owner
and a dove if they are an intruder. Bourgeois
strategy has been observed among some group
living mammals such as lions and primates. For
example, it has been found [5] that in a hierar-
chical society such as that of baboons (Figure 3),
if a particular male baboon had a bonding with a female, then a
second male which has watched this relationship will not chal-
lenge the first male for ownership (i.e., male # 2 plays dove). If at
a later time, the second baboon forms a relationship with another
female, the first male will not challenge it (male # 1 now plays
dove). This reduces the probability of injury for all males.
The Rock-Paper-Scissors Game: Nash Equilibrium that is
not an ESS
One of the fascinating examples of a rock-paper-scissors game in
Nature is the mating game between males of the side-blotched
lizard (Uta stansburiana), [6]. These lizards are found in the
coastal ranges of California, USA. In these lizards, males have
three color morphs (strategy):
• Orange throat – large and very aggressive and defend larger
territories (territory includes animal foraging ground and mates).
• Blue throat – less aggressive, monogamous and have small
territories.
• Yellow throat – sneaky and do not defend territories.
Evolutionarygame
theory had its
origin in Charles
Darwin’s theory of
Natural Selection.
Figure 3. A female chacma
baboon with its young.
Photo: Shomen Mukherjee
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In this game (Figure 4), ‘orange’ beats ‘blue’, as it is more
aggressive and manages to mate with many more females, ‘blue’
beats ‘yellow’ as ‘yellow’ cannot fool him as he has only one
female to protect, and ‘yellow’ beats ‘orange’, by sneaking up on
his females and mating with them without having to guard any
territory.
These three morphs have been locked in this perpetual game.
When one color morph become more abundant in a population,
females have the unique tendency to prefer the morphs that are
rarer. The ratio of the three male morphs orbit around equilibrium
(1/3, 1/3, 1/3), but it does not reach an ESS, however, the
population reaches an evolutionary stable state.
Nash Equilibrium and Evolutionary Game Theory: A Brief
History
One of the most significant contributions of John Nash was in the
field of non-cooperative game theory (part of classical game
theory), which seeks to explain both cooperation and non-coop-
eration. He suggested a gamewhere one looks at a combination of
strategies, one per player. If the players act according to this
combination, each player achieves his maximum payoff against
any of the other strategies played by the other player. This is the
Nash equilibrium point among the different strategies in a ratio-
nal game [7], (described in detail elsewhere in this issue). In Nash
Although humans
compared to other
species, are more
intelligent and
rational,ESS
provided an elegant
way of extending
game theory to the
‘less -gifted’
members of the
animal kingdom who
might not make a
conscious choice of a
given strategy, but
are rather genetically
programmed to do
so.
Figure 4. The perpetual
game of rock-paper-scissor
seen in the side-blotched liz-
ards in coastal California.
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equilibrium, no alternative strategies provide a better reply than
the equilibrium, making the equilibrium point the best response
of one player with regard to the other. Nash equilibrium point
soon became revolutionary with its applications in the field of
economics.
Although evolutionary game theory had its origin in Charles
Darwin’s1 theory of natural selection2, which states that the fittest
genetic make up or the best behaviour or strategy is more likely to
survive, be successful, and hence replicate (survival of the fittest)
to the next generation [8]. In 1973, John Maynard Smith3, a
British theoretical evolutionary biologist, and George Price, a
population geneticist, came up with a seminal concept ‘ESS’ [1],
which changed the way biologists looked at things. The idea of
ESS first evolved in the context of intra-specific (within species)
outcomes, such as sex ratios and animal conflicts. Maynard-
Smith and Price derived the theory of evolutionary games, partly
from the theory of classical games and in part from the work of
Robert MacArthur [9] and William Hamilton[10] on the evolu-
tion of sex ratios in animals. Julian Sorell Huxley had proposed
[11] that ritualistic or conventional behavior (as ‘C’ in ABOL–
TABOL game) is more common, while the use of dangerous
behavior or weapons (as ‘D’ in ABOL–TABOL game) within a
population is rare, as it would be selected against the survival of
a species. Natural selection would select against individuals
using a dangerous strategy. Individuals with such a strategy
would become rare in the population simply because they would
die of their injury. Later, Hamilton also proposed that exces-
sively aggressive individuals will injure their close relatives and
hence will be selected against in a population.
After Maynard-Smith and Price [1] mathematically derived why
a given behaviour or strategywas adopted by a certain proportion
of the population at a given time, it was shown that a strategy
which is currently stable in a population need not be stable in
evolutionary time (across generations). Additionally it was sug-
gested that an individual may play a mixture of strategies. In 1981
Robert Axelrod conducted a computer tournament where people
3 See Vidyanand Nanjundiah,
John Maynard Smith (1920–
2004) – One of the last Grand
Evolutionary Theorists of the
20th Century, Resonance, Vol.
10, No.11, pp.70–78, 2005.
2 See Sahotra Sarkar, Wallace
and Natural Selection, 1858,
Resonance, Vol.13, No.3,
pp.236–244, 2008.
1 See Renee M Borges, Revolu-
tions in Evolutionary Thought:
Darwin and After, Resonance,
Vol.14, No.2, pp.102–123, 2009.
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were invited to submit strategies for playing 200 prisoner’s
dilemma game [12], and the strategy which won was the simple
Tit-for-Tat strategy, submitted by Anatol Rapoport. This strategy
had two rules, on first move cooperate, and on the successive
moves do what your opponent did in the previous move. Tit-for-
Tat proved to be an ESS strategy, a very important strategywhich
could help explain reciprocal altruistic behaviour among animals.
Though derived from the classical game theory, evolutionary
game theory is different from the classical game theory in its
assumptions [13].
1. Rationality vs. natural selection: In a classic rational game, all
players know the full structure of the game and make conscious
and rational choices to play the game. Here, the assumption is that
all humans are rational and an agent or player in a game thinks or
reasons rationally and intelligently and plays each move strategi-
cally. Although humans compared to other species, are more
intelligent and rational, ESS [1] provided an elegant way of
extending game theory to the ‘less-gifted’ members of the animal
kingdom who might not make a conscious choice of a given
strategy, but are rather genetically programmed to do so. Initially,
ESS was described as a systematic equilibrium in a two-person
(or two-strategy) game, in which the winner is the individual who
continues for longer. An individual who can play longer will
generally be larger and healthier and hence, natural selection will
favor those traits. However, larger body size might be a disadvan-
tage while running from predators. Additionally, the size and
strength of an animal may not change day-to-day, but can change
with age, which might impact the frequency of these traits (and
underlying genes) in a population [14]. Considering that the
different players in a game are members in a population of a
species, the population can be divided into ‘n’ number of strate-
gies. Evolutionary games will consider the circumstances under
which the frequency of one strategy is stable against the fre-
quency of others in a population. Therefore, real life games,
where outcome of a strategy depends on the physical environment
Evolutionary
games are not only
prevalent in large
mammals like
cats, deer, mice,
and monkeys, but
this type of games
are seen in smaller
invertebrates such
as Daphnia, dung
beetles, microbes
and also in plants.
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(where the player is) and the social environment (with whom the
player is interacting), situations become more complicated.
2. Payoff vs. fitness: In the classical game theory (e.g., Nash’s
equilibrium theory), the winning or losing of a strategy is the
payoff of a particular strategy (utility function) (Figure 2). In
evolutionary games, this pay-off or the utility function is an
equivalent of the fitness function. Since natural selection is ruled
by the survival of the fittest, the fitness of an individual is the
number of offspring an individual can conduce to the next genera-
tion. In other words, this is the model of replication of a strategy
(DNA replication) so that it is carried over to the next generation.
Similar to the classical games, the evolutionary games also follow
certain assumptions [2], such as:
a) In a mixed-strategy population, the sum of frequencies of the
strategies will be equal to 1.
b) Depending on the mutant strategy4, which is against the parent
strategy, a mutant will either infiltrate or die-off in a popula-
tion.
c) Member of a population will be paired randomly.
d) Birth and death rates are constant.
Evolutionary games are not only prevalent in large mammals like
cats, deer, mice, and monkeys, but this type of games are seen in
smaller invertebrates such as Daphnia (water flea), dung beetles,
microbes and also in plants. For example, its has been shown [15]
that in plants, investment in plant height improves their access to
light, but imposes costs in construction and maintaining a large
trunk that defies gravity. However, for a single plant, its access to
light will depend on other height-strategies that are present in the
neighborhood. Falster and Westoby [15] identified 14 ESS of
traits that influence this competition for light. There is a diversity
of such examples in Nature. The very fact that different strategies
are coexisting in Nature tells us about a successful ESS. ESS was
introduced to address the prevalence of ritual fighting in interspe-
cific animal conflicts, which ultimately led to explorations in
asymmetric and multistep games. From conflicts of mate choice,
4. In biology, a mutant is an or-
ganism with a new genetic char-
acter, often a result of mutation
(a permanent alteration of nucle-
otide sequence in the genome).
If such an individual has a new
strategy, it would be called a
mutant strategy.
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sibling rivalry, parent–offspring antagonism to theories of social
foraging, dispersal, habitat selection, as well as evolutionary
arms race between predator and prey and virus and host, ESS has
been widely applied in biology [16].
Although Nash’s equilibrium point became widely accepted in
the context of rational games, in his unpublished PhD disserta-
tion, John Nash had provided another interpretation of his equi-
librium, the population-statistics [7]. As opposed to the rational
interpretation, where the game is played only once, in this ap-
proach the game is played over and over again and the players do
not actually know the structure of the game. In his thesis Nash
stated:
It is unnecessary to assume that the participants have full
knowledgeof the total structure of the game, or the ability and
inclination to go through any complex reasoning processes.
But the participants are supposed to accumulate empirical
information on the relative advantages of the various pure
strategies at their disposal. Since there is to be no collabora-
tion between individuals playing in different positions of the
game, the probability that a particular n-tuple of pure strat-
egies will be employed in a playing of the game should be the
product of the probabilities indicating the chance of each of
the n pure strategies to be employed in a random playing.
The concept of dynamic stability aims to understand what hap-
pens when the population state is slightly perturbed, particularly
when invaded by a rare (once extinct) strategy.Although not
widely known, Nash did identify dynamically stable population
states in large strategically interacting populations [17]. This
suggests that although biologists were unaware of this contribu-
tion of Nash to ESS, his ingenuity was undoubted. He indeed had
a ‘beautiful mind’.
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